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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the Appeals Board decision that Mrs. Wood did not show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that her mental stress arose from her employment was 
supported by substantial evidence. (R. pp. 172-79) 
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
Respondents argue that despite the conceded fact that Mrs. Wood's back injury 
was work related it should be treated as a non-work related injury based on the doctrine 
of res judicata. This argument should be rejected because the prior claim that 
Respondents argue bars this claim is not identical to the current claim. Furthermore, the 
settlement agreement the Respondent's rely on as the basis of their claim expressly states 
that it should not affect the current claim. 
Respondents also argue that Mrs. Wood's headaches were not a cause of her 
mental stress but were at least in part a symptom of them. This argument only 
underscores the fact that at least a portion of Mrs. Wood's headaches are work related. 
Additionally, Respondents argue in regards to the lack of any evidentiary support 
for the finding that Mrs. Wood's personal life stressors contributed to her mental illness 
that the Appeals Board is free to make findings of fact even if they are not based on 
substantial evidence because the finding requires no special knowledge or skill. This 
argument is inconsistent with the law, which requires that the Labor Commission's 
findings be based on substantial evidence. 
Respondents argue that the Medical Panel opinion is substantial evidence and that 
failure to address causation is merely a semantic error that should not make the report 
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inadequate to support the Appeals Board decision. However, it is clear that the report 
does not address the causes of Mrs. Wood's mental illness as the statute requires but only 
her current functioning at the time of the exam. Furthermore, much of the evidence it 
relies on to show that Mrs. Wood's stress was not predominantly work-related is in fact 
work-related. Thus, the Medical Panel opinion is not substantial evidence. 
Finally, the Respondents argue that Dr. Mooney's opinion is sufficient to support 
the Appeals Board decision when considered in conjunction with other substantial 
evidence. However, the other substantial evidence the Respondents point to is the 
Medical Panel report, which itself relied on Dr. Mooney's opinion to support is 
conclusion. Furthermore, Dr. Mooney's report does not address the issue of causation. 
Therefore, Dr. Mooney's report is not substantial evidence that can support the Appeals 
Board's decision. 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the Appeals Board decision and remand this 
case for reconsideration of the various work and non-work related factors in their proper 
context. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPEALS BOARD FINDING THAT MRS. WOOD'S MENTAL 
STRESS WAS NOT PREDOMINANTLY CAUSED BY WORK-RELATED 
STRESSES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Where the agency's decision is based upon factual findings unsupported by the 
record or where those findings of fact are overwhelmed by other relevant evidence the 
reviewing court should reverse the agency decision. Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service 
Comm., 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah App. 1997). U.C.A. § 34A-3-106(2)(a) requires that 
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Mrs. Wood show "proof of extraordinary mental stress arising predominantly and directly 
from employment." This Court has found that this provision requires that Mrs. Wood 
"show that the sum of all work related stress is greater than the sum of all non-work 
related stress." Wood II, Tf9. Thus, Mrs. Wood is required to show that her mental stress 
arose from a total of work-related stress that was greater than non-work related stress. 
In the present case, the facts cited by the Appeals Board do not support the 
conclusion that Mrs. Wood's mental stress was not caused by work-related stress. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the Appeals Board decision. 
A. Any Stress Caused by Mrs. Wood's Work-Related Back Injury is Work-
Related 
As the Appeals Board noted and now as the Respondents have conceded, Mrs. 
Wood's back injury was work-related. (Respondents Brief p. 3). Respondents argue that 
despite this fact the mental stress should be considered non-work related as a matter of 
law because Mrs. Wood signed a settlement agreement releasing Respondents from any 
and all claims related to the accident that caused her back injury. Thus, according to the 
Respondents, the doctrine of res judicata not only bars Mrs. Wood from arguing that the 
pain from her back injury was a work related stress but also requires that the back injury 
be considered a non-work related stress. However, the Respondents' argument must fail 
because the claim presently before the court is not identical to the claim that was settled 
and because the settlement agreement expressly states that it was to have no affect on this 
claim. 
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The Respondents argue that the doctrine of res judicata prevents the court from 
considering the back injury a work related stress. In fact, the Respondents take the 
argument one step further and argue that res judicata requires that any stress related to 
the back injury be considered non-work related. (Respondent's Brief p. 4). These 
arguments are not supported by the doctrine of res judicata. 
The doctrine of res judicata precludes a claim only when (i) 'the same parties' (ii) 
present a claim that was or that 'could and should have been raised' in a previous suit, 
and (iii) the previous suit 'resulted in a final judgment.'" Acosta v. Salt Lake Regional 
Medical Center, 2004 UT App 411, If 2 {unpublished, citing Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. 
Co., 2002 UT 6, If 58). For this doctrine to apply all three elements must be met. The 
current claim only satisfies one element of this doctrine; the same parties are involved. 
This claim could not and should not have been raised as part of the back injury 
claim. This claim presents a set of distinct facts and relies on distinct evidence unrelated 
to the back injury claim. These two claims, which the Respondents argue are identical, 
are not based on the same date of injury, are not based on the same mechanism of injury, 
do not have the same result of injury, and are based on fundamentally different legal 
theories. The Respondents quote extensively from the Acosta case but the only similarity 
they are able to find is that like Acosta, Mrs. Wood's first claim was for an industrial 
accident and her second claim was for an occupational disease. Acosta's occupational 
disease claim arose out of the same fundamental facts and had the same injury result as 
the accident claim she had earlier raised. However, this case involves a distinct set of 
facts and did not arise until Mrs. Wood's mental breakdown, years after the back injury. 
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Also, the mental stress injury is fundamentally a different injury than the back injury. At 
the time of her back injury, Mrs. Wood did not have a mental stress injury. There was no 
possibility of the mental stress claim being raised as part of the back injury claim. 
Furthermore, if the settlement agreement relied upon by the Respondents is to be 
given full effect then it must have no effect on this claim. The settlement agreement 
contemplated the current litigation and in that regard staled that "[Mrs. Wood] still has an 
ongoing occupational disease claim which is not affected by the settlement." (R. p. 183). 
However, if as the Respondents argue, the agreement requires that the work-related back 
injury be considered non-work related then the agreement will not be given effect 
because the back injury will be allowed to be treated as a non-work injury. As such, it 
will be allowed to stand against Mrs. Wood, a result directly contrary to the language of 
the agreement. 
Thus, the Respondents' argument that the work-related back injury should be 
considered non-work related must fail. The evidence establishes that the current claim is 
not identical to the back injury claim as Respondents argue because it involves a different 
injury that arose out of a different set of facts and is based on a fundamentally different 
legal theory. Also, the evidence established that the settlement agreement was not meant 
to have a negative impact on this claim. Therefore, the Appeals Board decision should be 
reversed because it is not based on substantial evidence. 
B. A Portion of the Stress Caused by Mrs. Wood's Headaches is Work Related 
Respondents argue that Mrs. Wood's headaches were not a source of the mental 
stress but were caused by the mental stress. The Respondents' argument acknowledges 
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that at least a portion of the headaches the Appeals Board cited as non-work related were 
in fact the result of work-related stress. This is the argument raised by Mrs. Wood as 
well. 
The Appeals Board cited the headaches as a non-work related stress that 
contributed to Mrs. Wood's mental injury. However, the evidence clearly indicates that 
at least a portion of these headaches were work related. The importance of this argument 
is not that the headaches caused her condition as the Respondents suggest but that the 
headaches do not constitute substantial evidence that would support the Appeals Board's 
conclusion. The Appeals Board relied on these headaches as a non-work related factor 
but the evidence establishes that they were at least partially related to Mrs. Wood's stress 
from her employment. Thus, the Appeals Board reliance on these headaches as non-work 
related is contrary to the evidence. Therefore, the headaches are not substantial evidence 
that supports the Appeals Board's finding and the Appeals Board's decision must be 
reversed. 
C. There is no Evidence in the Record to Support the Conclusion that the Stress 
in Mrs. Wood's Personal Life is a Cause of her Mental Stress. 
The Respondents argue that the Appeals Board does not need to have medical 
support for its apparent finding that Mrs. Wood's personal life was a contributing mental 
stress. This argument is simply wrong. The law requires that an administrative decision 
be based on substantial evidence. There is no evidence in the record medical or 
otherwise that supports the Appeals Board conclusion. It is as simple as that. An agency 
decision is not based on substantial evidence if it is based on mere conclusion. A.M.L. v. 
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Dept. of Health, 863 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah App. 1993). Therefore, there is no foundation in 
the record for the Appeals Board consideration of these personal situations as non-work 
related factors that caused Mrs. Wood's stress. 
D. The Medical Panel Opinion does not Support the Appeals Board Conclusion 
Respondents argue that Mrs. Wood should have raised the issue of whether the 
Medical Panel opinion supports the Appeals Board conclusion as an objection to the 
Medical Panel report at an earlier point in this litigation. However, Mrs. Wood's 
argument is not that the Medical Panel opinion itself was somehow in error. Mrs. 
Wood's argument is that the Medical Panel opinion is not sufficient evidence to support 
the Appeals Board conclusion that Mrs. Wood's mental stress was not predominantly 
caused by work-related stress. The Medical Panel opinion does not address the issue of 
whether the mental stress arose predominantly and directly from employment. The 
statute expressly requires that causation be determined based on the stressors that made 
the condition arise. When the statute is given effect the Medical Panel opinion does not 
support the Appeals Board decision. 
U.C.A. § 34A-3-106 (2)(a) requires that Mrs. Wood show "proof of extraordinary 
mental stress arising predominantly and directly from employment." (Emphasis added.) 
When analyzing statutory language the Court should "give effect to each term according 
to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Wood Hat f 8 (citing State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 
82 | 7). Therefore, the term "arising" must be given its ordinary and accepted meaning, 
which means that the statute requires an analysis of the factors that caused the condition 
to arise or come about. This Court has found that this provision requires that Mrs. Wood 
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"show that the sum of all work related stress is greater than the sum of all non-work 
related stress." Wood II, [^9. Thus, Mrs. Wood is required to show that her mental stress 
arose from a total of work related stress that was greater than non-work related stress. 
This issue, contrary to the Respondents' argument, could not have been raised 
earlier in this litigation. This is the third time this case has been presented to this Court 
but it is the first time the issue of substantial evidence has been fully litigated. 
Furthermore, the earlier decisions in this case were vacated and the most recent Appeals 
Board decision is the first decision that directly addresses the issue of whether Mrs. 
Wood's mental stress arose predominantly and directly from her employment. So, this is 
the first time that the issue of whether the Medical Panel opinion was sufficient evidence 
to support to the Appeals Board decision that Mrs. Wood's mental stress was not 
predominantly caused by work-related stress is being addressed. 
Mrs. Wood also wishes to re-emphasize that it is not just the fact that the Medical 
Panel opinion does not address what stresses caused Mrs. Wood's mental stress to arise 
that makes it insufficient to be considered substantial evidence. Additionally the Medical 
Panel opinion considered several work-related stresses as non-work related in its 
evaluation such as Mrs. Wood's back injury, the headaches, and Dr. Mooney's report, all 
facts, which are not sufficient to support the conclusion that Mrs. Wood's mental stress 
was not predominantly work-related. 
The Medical Panel report does not address the issue of whether Mrs. Wood's 
mental stress arose from a total of work related stress that was greater than non-work 
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related stress. Therefore, the Medical Panel opinion is not substantial evidence under the 
facts of this case sufficient to support the Appeals Board decision. 
E. The Report of George Mooney, Ph.D. Does Not Support the Appeals Board 
Conclusion 
Respondents next argue that Dr. Mooney's opinion supports the Appeals Board 
decision when it is considered in conjunction with other substantial evidence. However, 
the Respondents point to no facts which are substantial evidence that support Dr. 
Mooney's report. Dr. Mooney's report is important because it was relied on by both the 
Appeals Board and the Medical Panel. However, as the Respondents seem to 
acknowledge, Dr. Mooney's report does not address the issue of what the predominant 
causes of Mrs. Wood's mental stress were. 
The insufficiency of Dr. Mooney's report undermines the Appeals Board opinion 
and the Medical Panel report. Despite the Respondents' argument that other substantial 
evidence makes Dr. Mooney's report supportive of the Appeal Board decision, the only 
piece of evidence they point to is the Medical Panel report. As has been shown 
previously the Medical Panel opinion is not substantial evidence. Furthermore, the 
Medical Panel opinion itself relies on Dr. Mooney's report. So, the Respondents' 
argument is circular. Considering that the Medical Panel's opinion was that 50% of Mrs. 
Wood's then current functioning was related to non-work stress even a minor change in 
how the evidence was evaluated by the Medical Panel could lead to a completely 
different result. Thus, the insufficiency of Dr. Mooney's report even considering the 
Respondent's arguments really only undermines the Medical Panel Report. 
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Thus, Dr. Mooney's report does not support the Appeals Board finding that Mrs. 
Wood's condition was not predominantly caused by work-related factors. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the Appeals Board decision and remand this case for 
proper consideration of the work and non-work related factors because the Appeals 
Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The Respondents' argument 
that the work-related back injury should be considered a non-work related injury under 
the doctrine of res judicata should be rejected because this claim is not identical to the 
back injury claim. Furthermore, the Respondents argument that the back injury should be 
considered non-work related is contrary to the settlement agreement which states that the 
agreement will have no affect on the present litigation. 
The Respondents' arguments that the Appeals Board decision to treat the supposed 
stress in Mrs. Wood's personal life as non-work should be rejected because there is no 
evidence to support that conclusion and all agency decision should be based on 
substantial evidence. Similarly, the Appeals Board reliance on the Medical Panel opinion 
and Dr. Mooney's report was in error because those reports do not support the conclusion 
that Mrs. Wood's stress was not predominantly caused by work-related factors. In fact, 
they do not even address that issue. Therefore, the Appeals Board decision should be 
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reversed and this case should be remanded for proper consideration of the work and non-
work related factors. 
7& Dated this 2#_ day of December 2009 
/j#y7BOTies 
Attorney for Mrs. Wood 
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